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This paper is a quantitative, equilibrium study of the insurance role of severance pay when
workers face displacement risk and markets are incomplete. A key feature of our model is
that, in line with an established empirical literature, job displacement entails a persistent fall
in earnings upon re-employment due to the loss of tenure. The model is solved numerically
and calibrated to the US economy. In contrast to previous studies that have analyzed
severance payments in the absence of persistent earning losses, we find that the welfare gains
from the insurance against job displacement afforded by severance pay are sizable.
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1. Introduction
Employment contracts often contain explicit severance-pay provisions.1 Many countries
also mandate minimum levels of severance pay and other forms of employment protection.
Both privately-contracted and legislated severance pay provisions are commonly increasing,
approximately linear, functions of job tenure (see, e.g., OECD 2013 and Parsons 2013). The
existence of these measures is difficult to understand in the context of standard, complete-
markets models in which workers maximize expected labor income and wages are perfectly
flexible. As observed by Lazear (1990), employment protection measures have no useful role
in such a setting. This has lead some authors (e.g., Pissarides, 2001) to conclude that the
debate about employment protection has been mostly conducted within a framework that is
not appropriate for a proper evaluation of its role.
There is robust evidence documenting both the failure of complete risk sharing2 and the
substantial costs associated with job loss.3 For example, Couch and Placzek (2010) estimate
earnings reductions for workers affected by mass layoffs of more than 30 percent in the post-
displacement year and as much as 15 percent six years later. The extent and persistence of
displacement losses has prompted calls (e.g., LaLonde, 2007) for the introduction of long-
term insurance for displaced workers by means of earnings supplements upon re-employment.
Yet, loss-based, earnings-replacement insurance is subject to moral hazard issues due to its
conditionality on wages being lower in the new job. In fact, the lack of, even public, provision
of earnings-replacement insurance suggests that this kind of issues are even more relevant
than in the case of unemployment insurance.
These considerations suggest that a candidate explanation for the existence of severance
pay is as a means of (imperfectly) insuring displaced workers against labor market risk and,
1Parsons (2013) reports that 36 percent of US workers in firms with more than 100 employees and 16
percent in smaller businesses, were covered by severance-payment clauses over the period 1980-2001. For the
UK, the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey reveals that 51 percent of union companies bargained
over the size of (non-statutory) severance pay for non-manual workers and 42 percent for manual workers
(see Millward, Neil et al., 1992).
2See, e.g., Attanasio and Davis (1996) and Hayashi et al. (1996).
3Examples include Jacobson et al. (1993), Farber (2005), Couch and Placzek (2010) and Davis and von
Wachter (2011).
2
in particular, against the persistence of earnings losses upon re-employment.
The objective of this paper is to provide a quantitative, equilibrium framework to assess
the role of severance pay as an insurance device. The crucial features of our analysis that
distinguish it from existing contributions are: a detailed modeling of the sources of labor
market risk, and imperfect insurance. In particular, in addition to labor market search
frictions, we allow workers’ productivity and job duration to be functions of both age and
on-the-job tenure. Namely, job displacement risk has two components: the—temporary—
loss of earnings associated with transition through unemployment and the—persistent—loss
of earnings upon re-employment due to the loss of tenure. To isolate the pure insurance role
of severance pay, we assume, following Lazear (1990) and most of the matching literature,
that wages are flexible (full bonding). Given the significance that life-cycle factors—namely,
asset accumulation and the positive correlation between age and job-tenure—play for agents’
ability to insure against job-loss, we cast our analysis in a life-cycle setting.
A calibrated version of our model implies the following results. First, the average welfare
gains of realistic severance pay schemes are positive and quantitatively important, ranging
between 0.5 and 1 percentage points. Second, a large fraction of these gains stem from the
fact that severance pay provide insurance against the—persistent—loss of tenure associated
with job displacement. In fact, in line with the findings in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001),
severance pay would actually reduce average welfare in the absence of tenure effects on wages,
as the insurance gains would be more than offset by the fall in precautionary savings and the
equilibrium capital stock. Finally, the model can explain why severance pay is generally an
increasing function of on-the-job tenure. Keeping constant the average severance transfer,
the average welfare gains are between 15 and 20 per cent higher if the transfer is (linearly)
increasing in tenure. A tenure-independent transfer over-insures workers with low tenure.
The paper is related to a large literature that can be divided into two main strands.
The first strand studies the role of employment protection measures in environments with
risk-neutral agents. Its main result ( Lazear, 1990) is that, if wage bargaining is efficient,
employment protection is non-neutral only if it entails a tax component that is lost to the
firm-worker pair. This “firing tax” is always welfare-reducing and has ambiguous, and model-
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specific, employment effects.4 Conversely, severance pay—the pure transfer component of
employment protection measures5—is neutral unless efficient wage bargaining is constrained.
If downward-rigid wages in ongoing matches results in inefficient separation, severance pay
reduces job destruction and increase job creation and efficiency as long as entry-wage flex-
ibility allows workers to pre-pay for future transfers ( Saint-Paul, 1995; Fella, 2000, 2012).
Entry-wage rigidity constrains such pre-payment and implies that severance pay reduces job
creation and, possibly, employment and efficiency (Garibaldi and Violante, 2005).
This paper is closer to the second, and more recent, strand of the literature that develops
microfoundations for the (potential) relevance of legislated employment protection measures
based on risk-averse workers and incomplete markets. Fella and Tyson (2013) build an
incomplete-market version of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and use it to characterize
the privately-optimal size of severance pay and show that Lazear’s (1990) neutrality result
(approximately) holds despite asset market incompleteness. Alvarez and Veracierto (2001)
were the first to study the welfare effects of severance payments in an incomplete market
setting. Our findings are complementary to theirs. Differently from us, they assume that
a unique wage applies to all jobs and, therefore, that job destruction is inefficiently high in
the absence of severance pay. As pointed out by Ljungqvist (2002), it is this assumption of
wage rigidity, rather than market incompleteness, that accounts for the large welfare gains
they find. Indeed, Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) find that the pure insurance benefit of
severance pay is negligible and even negative in their environment, given the short duration
of a typical unemployment spell and the absence of tenure effect on wages, which implies
that the earnings of displaced workers fully recover upon re-employment.
Rogerson and Schindler (2002) is the first quantitative equilibrium study of the welfare
costs of the risk of persistent earnings losses. They evaluate the welfare costs of a one-off, mid-
4Firing taxes depress employment in environments with employment lotteries (Hopenhayn and Rogerson,
1993), and in matching models if they increase workers’ threat point in new matches. The latter is the
case only if firms, counter-factually, incur the firing tax even if an encounter with an unemployed worker is
not turned into an employment relationship, as in Millard and Mortensen (1997) (see Ljungqvist 2002 and
reference therein for a comprehensive discussion).
5Garibaldi and Violante (2005) and Fella (2007) argue that firing taxes are unlikely to be quantitatively
important.
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career, permanent earnings loss in an incomplete-market setting, but with no unemployment.
They find that the welfare cost of a permanent 30% earnings loss at age 45 is around half
a percentage point of permanent consumption. Since the shock is one-off, permanent and
common to all workers it can be perfectly insured by a common, one-off transfer equal to
about four years of wages. Unlike them, the combination of returns to tenure and positive job
loss hazard in each period implies heterogeneity of displacement costs in our environment.
We find that the welfare gains from severance pay are significantly larger in our set up,
despite the fact that our parameterization implies more conservative and non-permanent
displacement costs, and that we restrict attention to a (linear) severance-pay schedule in
line with observed measures.
Krebs (2007) evaluates the welfare gains from eliminating the cyclical variation in id-
iosyncratic job displacement risk, while we study the welfare gains from using severance pay
to provide insurance against the average job displacement risk.
Michelacci and Ruffo (2015) study the optimal age profile of unemployment benefit re-
placement rates in a life cycle model with unemployment risk and on-the-job accumulation
of (general) human capital. They show that the trade-off between moral hazard and in-
surance/liquidity provision associated with unemployment benefits is weak for young unem-
ployed workers, who have little wealth and high returns to on-the-job human capital accu-
mulation, and steep for older workers. As a result, optimal replacement rates are strongly
decreasing in age. They find that allowing for optimal severance pay adds little to the wel-
fare gains from the optimal policy. The main difference is that, since earnings losses depend
on age but not tenure in their model, their calibration implies substantially lower losses for
older (usually high-tenure) workers compared to both our calibration and the data.
On the positive side, the paper is also related to a number of recent contributions that
propose alternative mechanisms to generate realistic displacement costs. In line with the
job-ladder models of Jarosch (2015) and Krolikowski (2015), it generates earnings losses as
a result of both lower average match quality upon reemployment and a downward-sloping
separation-tenure profile that slows down the rate at which workers rebuild match capital.6 In
Huckfeldt (2016) there is effectively a job ladder across occupations, with better occupations
6The coexistence of these two forces was first documented by Stevens (1997).
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having both higher productivity and higher rates of skill accumulation. Persistent earnings
losses are the result of job loss being associated with a fall off the occupational ladder. Our
environment captures these forces in reduced form, while maintaining sufficient tractability
to study the welfare implications of earnings losses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model,
Section 3 discusses the calibration and Section 4 presents the main results. Finally, Section
5 discusses the sensitivity of the results to our assumptions, while Section 6 concludes.7
2. The model
This section describes the economic environment and the recursive representation of
agents’ optimization problems. We restrict attention to the steady state equilibrium.
2.1. Environment
Demographics, preferences and endowments: The economy is populated by a mea-
sure one of agents (workers) in every period. Agents have stochastic lifetimes, transiting
through working ages i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., I} , retirement8 and, eventually, dying. We denote by
pii the, constant, age-transition probability and by ρi the retirement probability for an agent
of age i. Retired agents die with constant probability pid and are replaced by a newborn who
starts life as an unemployed.
Agents are not altruistic and have time-separable preferences with time discount factor
β ∈ (0, 1). Their intra-period utility function is defined over consumption c and search effort
ψ as
U(c, ψ) = u(c)− vψ,
with v > 0 and u (.) strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfying the Inada conditions.
The search effort choice is binary (participation) and defined over the set Ψ ≡ {0, 1}.9
7A supplementary online Appendix documents the numerical methods used, the data and the details of
the calibration, and provides some additional results.
8We consider a retirement period because of its role in generating a realistic saving behavior. The existence
of a reasonable—7 years in our calibration—retirement period is also important for the insurance value of
severance pay for older workers.
9Note that for the same consumption level, employed workers enjoy (weakly) higher utility than unem-
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Let b ∈ B ≡ {0, 1} denote an unemployed worker’s benefit entitlement status. Agents of
working age can be employed, unemployed and eligible to collect unemployment benefits—
b = 1—or unemployed and ineligible to collect unemployment benefits—b = 0. Employed
workers supply labor inelastically. Newly born agents are endowed with a0 units of the
consumption good.
We index job tenure in the last job held by t,10 with t ∈ T = {1, ..., T}. Tenure on the
current job increases with constant probability pit > 0 between successive tenure levels until
t = T.
We assume that both tenure and age affect the productivity of a worker and denote by εs
the productivity level of a worker of type s ≡ (i, t) and by S the set of worker types I × T .
The component of productivity related to age i can be thought of as general human capital.
Conversely, the component of productivity due to on-the-job tenure t is not transferable and
lost upon job loss. Age and tenure transitions are assumed to be independent events.
Firms and technology: The population of production units (firms) is exogenous with
measure greater than one.11 Each firm uses one worker and capital to produce output
according to a common, constant returns to scale technology. The output of a firm employing
a worker of productivity εs and Ks units of capital is Ys = F (Ks, εs). The same production
function in intensive units is ys = f (ks), with ks = Ks/εs. Capital depreciates at the
exogenous rate δ.
Labor Market: Unemployed workers must search to find a firm with an unfilled vacancy
and are successful with probability φ(ψ) with φ(1) > φ(0) = 0.
At the beginning of each period a currently-active firm and its worker of type s bargain
over the wage ws according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution. After the wage is
agreed upon, capital is rented and production takes place. We consider the limit case in
ployed workers and quitting a productive job is never optimal. This feature, together with the binary effort
choice, simplifies the analysis substantially. A previous version of this paper, allowing for continuous job
search effort, yielded very similar results, but also numerical instability.
10Namely, t denotes tenure in the current job match for employed workers (including new hires) and tenure
in the last job for unemployed workers.
11The assumption implies that job creation by firms is exogenous.
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which the workers’ bargaining weight converges to one,12 which implies that the value of a
firm without a worker is zero.
At the end of the period, the firm can be hit with exogenous probability σs > 0 by an
idiosyncratic productivity shock that renders the match unproductive.13 If hit by the shock,
the firm lays its worker off, paying a severance payment—a one-off transfer—θs if the worker
is entitled to it. The severance payment is a non-negative function θs = γtws of the last
wage. Such specification allows the severance payment to depend both on productivity εs
and on tenure length t.14
Other market arrangements: The final good market and the rental market for physical
capital are competitive.
There are no state-contingent markets to insure against unemployment and income risk,
but there is a competitive banking sector that: 1) takes deposits from and lends to consumers
at the risk-free rate r; 2) holds firms and physical capital and rents the latter to firms.
Consumers’ borrowing is subject to a limit, denoted by d ≥ 0. There are perfect annuity
markets where retired workers share their mortality risk.
Government: Unemployed workers are entitled to unemployment benefits upon job loss,
but lose benefit entitlement with probability pib. The unemployment benefit for a worker of
type s whose benefits have not expired is given by $1s = RRws,
15 where RR is the benefit
12The assumption implies that wages are determined only by productivity and severance payments. If
firms had positive bargaining power wages would depend on the workers’ marginal utility of consumption and
wealth. This would substantially complicate the problem as one could not solve recursively for equilibrium
wages independently of the equilibrium wealth distribution. Krusell et al. (2010) show that, when firms’
bargaining power is positive, wealth affects only the wages of workers very close to the borrowing limit.
Furthermore, the effect is small and hardly relevant for wage dispersion.
13There is a large body of evidence, discussed for example in Gottschalk and Moffitt (1999), showing that
workers’ retention probabilities are significantly affected by a set of observables, such as age and tenure.
Age and tenure specific separation rates help in fitting the tenure and unemployment distributions, and the
unemployment rates over the life cycle.
14The ratio between severance pay and wages is indeed increasing in tenure for most OECD countries.
15In reality, unemployment benefits are usually proportional to the last wage. Since, s may change if the
worker ages over the course of an unemployment spell, our formulation makes benefits a function of the wage
a worker would have received in the current period had her tenure been the same as at the time of job loss.
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replacement rate.
Unemployed workers of type s whose benefits have expired still receive a flow $0s = g of
the consumption good, which can be thought of as a safety net policy (e.g., food stamps).
Finally, retired workers receive a pension income yp.
The government balances the budget in every period by levying a proportional labor
income tax τ on employed consumers to finance the unemployment insurance scheme, the
safety net program and the pay-as-you-go pension system.
2.2. Consumers
Let Ve(s, a) denote the value function of an employed consumer of type s = (i, t) with
current assets a while Vu(s, b, a) denotes the value function of an unemployed consumer of
type s, with benefit entitlement status b and current assets a. Finally, Vr(a) denotes the
value function of a retired consumer.
To streamline notation, we denote by pi(ς ′|ς) the generic transition probability from the
current value ς of a state variable to some future value ς ′. The recursive representation of
the problem of an employed consumer can then be written as
Ve(s, a) = max
c,a′
u(c) + βρiVr(a




pi(s′|s)Ve(s′, a′) + σs
∑
i′
pi(i′|i)Vu(s′, 1, a′ + θs)
]
s.t. c+ a′ = (1 + r) a+ (1− τ)ws a′ ≥ −d.
Employed agents receive a post-tax wage (1 − τ)ws, choose current consumption and face
several uncertain events in the future. They retire with probability ρi. With probability
(1 − ρi)(1 − σs) they remain in employment and may undergo a stochastic age or tenure
transition. With probability (1 − ρi)σs they lose their job and enter unemployment being
entitled to benefits, with a severance payment θs, and s
′ = (i′, t); namely job losers may
undergo an age but not a tenure transition. Hence the summation over i′ in the last term in
the square bracket.
In the numerical model, making the severance payment proportional to the last wage would have further
increased the dimension of the state space. Given the much larger probability of unemployment-employment
rather than age transitions, the number of age transitions among unemployed workers is negligible.
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The problem of unemployed agents of type s and benefit-entitlement status b can be
represented as follows
Vu (s, b, a) = max
c,a′,ψ




pi(i′|i)Ve(i′, 0, a′) + (1− φ(ψ))
∑
i′,b′
pi(i′, b′|i, b)Vu(s′, b′, a′)
]
s.t. c+ a′ = (1 + r) a+$bs, a
′ ≥ −d.
Unemployed agents choose optimally both their consumption/savings plans and whether to
participate in the labor market in the current period. They may retire with probability ρi.
Alternatively, if they participate—ψ = 1—they find a job with probability φ(1) and become
employed at the lowest tenure level. Workers who are entitled to benefits—$1s = RRws—
may also experience a change in the level of benefits either because of an age transition or
because of benefit expiration.
Finally, the problem of retired agents can be represented as follows
Vr (a) = max
c,a′
u(c) + β(1− pid)Vr(a′) (3)







Agents receive pension income yp, and the rate of return on their saving reflects the actuar-
ially fair insurance against their survival risk.
2.3. Firms
Firms maximize the present discounted value of profits. In every period, after wages have
been set, the value of a firm matched to a worker of type s satisfies
J (s) = max
ks









Similarly to equation (1), the firm’s Bellman equation takes into account all possible tran-
sitions the currently employed worker can go through. The firm’s payoff equals zero if the
match is destroyed due to the worker’s retirement, as retiring workers are not entitled to
severance pay and vacancies have zero value.
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Constant returns to scale imply all firms use the same stock of capital k per efficiency
unit of labor satisfying the first order condition
f ′(k) = r + δ. (5)
2.4. Wage determination
In each period, the wage solves the Nash bargaining problem
max
ws
(Ve(s, a)− Vu(s, b, a))ζ J(s)1−ζ .
This is the same bargaining solution used in Krusell et al. (2010). Contrary to Alvarez
and Veracierto (2001), but in line with the standard matching literature, it implies that wages
are privately efficient, subject to the constraint that bargaining is over spot wages rather
than contracts.16 It also assumes that severance pay does not affect the parties’ bargaining
threat points.17
It is straightforward to verify that in the limit when the worker’s bargaining weight ζ
converges to one, the equilibrium value of a productive match J(s) goes to zero. Hence, it
follows from equation (4) that ws satisfies
ws = f(k)εs − (r + δ) kεs − 1− ρi
1 + r
σsθs. (6)
The wage falls by the actuarially-fair value of the expected layoff transfer (full-bonding).18
3. Parameterization
We calibrate the model to data for male workers in the US economy, where there are no
mandated severance packages. In order to properly capture the labor market dynamics, we
work with a short time period; namely, one model period corresponds to two months.
16With risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms, bargaining over spot wages is only constrained-efficient
as it is Pareto dominated by bargaining over contracts. The assumption keeps separate the insurance role
of, exogenously-given, severance pay from that of more general, optimal contracting.
17This is the natural assumption for bargaining with new hires (‘outsiders’), as severance pay is not due if a
contact between a firm and a worker is not turned into a match. Section 5 discusses why, in our environment,
it is the more reasonable assumption even for ongoing matches.
18It follows that, at constant interest rate, severance pay does not affect the shadow cost of labor. Section
5 discusses how wage flexibility is sufficient for severance pay to have negligible effects on the allocation of
labor even with endogenous contact and destruction rates.
11
In what follows, we first comment upon the choice of parameters set outside the model
and then discuss those whose calibration requires solving for the equilibrium. All parameters
are reported in Table 1. We assume that newborns enter the economy without any asset
endowment, or a0 = 0. The CRRA coefficient η is set to 2.0, a common value in the literature
(see, e.g. Attanasio, 1999)
[Table 1 about here]
The age grid has 10 points each corresponding to a five-year age bracket. Workers enter
the economy at age 18-22 and reach at most age 63-67. It follows that pii = 0.033 for all
i < I. We specify the retirement probability as ρi = 0 for all ages between 18 and 47, and
ρi = 0.02 for the remaining ages. This parameter is calibrated for the model to match the
median age observed in the US labor force (39 years). The pensioners’ death probability is
set to pid = 0.0238, which matches the US Census share of (male) retirees of 15.6%.
The tenure grid goes has 11, equally-spaced, points each corresponding to a two-year
interval between 0-2 and 20+. On average workers in continuous employment experience an
increase in tenure every 2 years. It follows that pit = 0.083.
The unemployment benefit replacement rate is set to RR = 0.5, and the probability of
losing benefit eligibility is set to pib = 0.333 which implies an average benefit duration of
six months. These values capture unemployment benefit rules in place in several US states.
Transfers to unemployed workers who have lost eligibility are set to a $0s = 0.077, which
corresponds to a monthly payment of approximately $140. This value matches the average
transfer observed for households receiving food stamps in the US in 1996, according to USDA
(2014).
Pension income yp is set so as to imply a pension replacement rate equal to 0.394 of
average earnings, which is the value found in OECD (2011). The borrowing constraint d
is the natural one–the value of food stamps capitalized at the market interest rate—and
equals around 12 times average post-tax wages. Finally, γt = 0 in the benchmark economy
consistent with the absence of mandated severance pay in the US.
The capital depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.017 which implies an investment/output
share of about 20%, on an annual basis. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function,
with capital share equal to α = 0.3.
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The labor market statistics rely on CPS data for the period 1996-2006 and, in order to
be consistent with the model, we restrict our analysis to workers between the ages of 18 and
67.
The job finding probability for searching workers is set to φ(1) = 0.524 to match an
average unemployment duration of about 16 weeks in our target population.
The profile of efficiency units εs for s = (i, t) is estimated using CPS data.
19 We start by
estimating a simple linear regression by OLS, where the dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of earnings and the set of explanatory variables are a second-degree polynomial in
age and tenure and year dummies. Notice that, in order to preserve consistency between the
theoretical model and the data, we transformed the dependent variable and the explanatory
ones to the same time period of the model, that is we estimated log-wages on a bimonthly
basis. Table 2 reports the results of both an OLS and a Tobit regression. The Tobit
specification, taking into consideration the right censoring in the data due to top-coding,
gives virtually the same estimates. With the estimated parameters, we retrieve the {εs} as
the fitted values of the econometric model at all the pairs of the respective mid-points of our
tenure and age bins.
Although our estimation procedure does not deal with the likely pervasive selection and
endogeneity problems, it implies an estimated average return to tenure of approximately 2%
on a yearly basis. This value is in the middle of existing estimates of returns to tenure. At the
low end of the spectrum, Altonji and Williams (2005) reconcile the large discrepancies in the
seminal studies of returns to tenure by Abraham and Farber (1987), Altonji and Shakotko
(1987) and Topel (1991) and report a return of 1.1-1.4% per year as their preferred estimate
for the PSID. Yamaguchi (2010) estimates a similar value for the rate of job-specific wage
growth associated with employers matching of outside offers in the NLSY79. At the upper
end of the spectrum, Buchinsky et al. (2010) find a yearly average return of approximately
5% for the first ten years in the PSID. Dustmann and Meghir (2005) estimate a yearly return
19In the US also the NLSY and the PSID contain information on age and job tenure. The advantage of the
CPS is that it is a random sample of the whole US labor force, unlike the NLSY that contains information
on only one cohort and the PSID that provides a tenure measure contaminated by measurement error, as
discussed for example in Altonji and Williams (2005).
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of 4% for unskilled and 2.4% for skilled workers in the first five year of tenure and respectively
1.1 and 1.7% thereafter, using German administrative data.
[Table 2 about here]
The remaining parameters are chosen to minimize the sum of squared deviations of a set of
simulated moments from their data counterparts. The job destruction probability is assumed
to depend on age and tenure according to σs = σ·exp {−σi · (i− 1)− (σ0t + σ1t It>2) · (t− 1)},




t are parameters to be calibrated. σ represents the common starting
value for the job separation probability (for the young and untenured workers), while the
other three parameters allow for increasing job retention probabilities for workers that are
older and/or with higher seniority.




t ), together with the disutility of search effort v
and the rate of time preference β are calibrated with an over-identified moment-matching
procedure. It is implemented with more moments (33) than unknown parameters (6). The
moments we match are an annual interest rate of 4% and 32 moments from the CPS; namely,
the tenure distribution of the employed, the age distribution of the labor force, the profile
of unemployment rates over the life cycle, and the ratio of the number non-participants—
ψ = 0—to that of searching unemployed workers—ψ = 1. The target for this last moment is
0.06. This is the share, relative to the unemployed population, of the number of workers that
report having looked for work in the previous year—but not in the previous four weeks—
and and that do not report being discouraged.20 This target effectively identifies the search
cost. Since, for tractability, the model lacks an intensive search margin, targeting a category
of workers that are marginally attached—as opposed unambiguously out the labor force—
has the aim of ensuring a meaningful, extensive-margin response of the number of active
searchers to changes in policy.





β = 0.998 and v = 3.735.21 The job separation profiles imply a monthly mean separation
20The formal CPS category is marginally attached workers who are not discouraged.
21The complete list of targets and moments generated by the model, are reported in Table B.3 in the
online Appendix B.1.
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rate of 0.015. This is the same value used in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) and is line with
Fallick and Fleischman’s (2004) estimates from the CPS over our sample 1996-2006 period.
4. Numerical analysis
This section discusses the benchmark equilibrium and presents the results of our policy
experiments. Section 4.1 overviews the implications of the model for a range of non-targeted
data moments, while the remaining sections describe the policy experiments.
4.1. Further properties of the calibrated economy
Although the parameterization is quite parsimonious, the calibration achieves a very good
fit. The four panels in Figure 1 plot the data (the solid black line) against the model (the
dashed red line) statistics for the target marginal distributions of workers by age, employment
status and tenure.
[Figure 1 about here]
As for the age distribution of the labor force, plotted in panel 1, the model captures well
the decline in the shares of older workers, while it misses the non-monotonic behavior for
younger ones. The errors, though, are relatively small.
Panel 2 plots the distribution of current tenure for employed workers. The model captures
well the main patterns, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In particular, three important
features of the data are accounted for: the high share of jobs with less than two years of
tenure, the smoothly decreasing share of workers employed at increasing levels of tenure, and
the high share of jobs lasting for at least 20 years.22 The model somewhat misses, though,
the sharp decline moving from less than two to less than four years of tenure.
Panel 3 plots the age distribution of the unemployed distributions, while panel 4 the
unemployment rates over the life-cycle. The model overestimates the share of young unem-
ployed, while it matches almost perfectly the unemployment rates until age 50. As for Panel
22With a constant separation rate over age and tenure the model would miss the first and third charac-
teristics.
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4, also in this case age and tenure dependent separation rates are instrumental to achieve a
good fit.
Finally, a crucial—and untargeted—ingredient of our quantitative analysis is the size of
earnings losses associated with displacement. Following the seminal contribution of Jacobson
et al. (1993), a growing body of research has exploited program evaluation techniques applied
to administrative data to identify the causal effect of job displacement on earnings. The study
with the most comprehensive coverage is Davis and von Wachter (2011) (DV in what follows),
using annual Social Security records for all U.S. states from 1974 to 2008. To compare
our simulated data to their empirical estimates, we aggregate our simulated bi-monthly
wage series into annual earnings and estimate the following equation which is equivalent to
equation (1) in DV.
eyit = ι
y








where y is a separation year, the outcome variable eyit denotes yearly earnings for individual
i in year t, ιyi is an individual fixed effect, f(ageit) is a quartic polynomial in age and D
j
it are
dummies equal to one in the j-th year before or after displacement for the treatment group
of workers displaced in year y and zero otherwise. We follow DV and restrict attention to
workers aged less than 50 with at least 3 years of tenure in the current job.23 The sequence of
coefficients ξyj then captures the (absolute) change in earnings j years after the displacement
year relative to the control group of non-separators. Similarly, estimating equation (7) using
average wages (i.e., average earnings conditional on employment) rather than earnings as the
dependent variable returns a measure of post-displacement wage losses. Wages losses capture
the contribution to earnings losses of the loss of human capital. The difference between
earnings and wage losses is accounted for by the post-displacement fall in employment, the
result of post-displacement unemployment incidence and average unemployment duration.
Unemployment incidence is initially higher after a displacement event, as separation rates
are decreasing in tenure both in the model and in the data.
23DV consider workers displaced as part of a mass layoff (defined as a lasting decline in firm-level employ-
ment of at least 30%) to control for selection.
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The solid line in Figure 2 plots the earnings losses in the model against the losses es-
timated by DV for workers displaced as part of a mass layoff, respectively, in expansions
and recessions. Qualitatively, the model captures rather well the time profile of losses,24 but
implies a much faster recovery in the second post-displacement year, and lower afterwards.
Therefore, our estimated tenure profile of productivity implies substantially conservative
earnings losses compared to the estimates in DV. The dashed black line plots wages losses
in the model. Wages fall very little in the separation year, because most employment in
that year is pre-displacement. Instead, wages in the first post-displacement year are asso-
ciated with re-employment and are roughly 15% lower than counterfactual wages. The 10
percentage points difference between the earnings loss and the wage loss reflects both the
incidence of subsequent separations from post-displacement jobs and the average duration
of unemployment. Two years after displacement, though, earnings losses are due to the per-
sistent reduction in wages rather than in hours. These findings are consistent with Stevens
(1997) and Huckfeldt (2016) who also find a similar fast convergence of earnings and wages
for the PSID. Intuitively, though unemployment incidence increases with the loss of pre-
displacement tenure, given an average unemployment duration of one quarter in the US, the
contribution of higher post-displacement separation rates declines very quickly.25
Just looking at earnings losses, though, overestimates the income loss from job displace-
ment—which is the relevant loss from a welfare perspective—since it does not take into
account the income flow associated with unemployment benefits. For this reason, we also
compute the present value of the income loss for the average job loser in the model as
the difference in the present value of income (including unemployment benefits) between a
random sample of workers displaced in period t0 and the same sample in the counterfactual
when we turn off the separation at t0. For comparability with Davis and von Wachter (2011)
we compute the present value over twenty years and report two measures. The first one is the
24The difference between the model and the data in year zero, the displacement year, is due to the fact
that DV average over three adjacent years (see their fn. 12) to smooth the timing issues highlighted in
Stevens (1997).
25This findings contrasts with Jarosch (2015), who finds a much slower convergence of wages and earnings
using German data. The difference can easily be reconciled once one notes that the unemployment exit rate
in the German economy is nearly one third of the US one (0.09 per month instead of 0.26).
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present value income loss as a percentage of the present value of income in the counterfactual
and equals 5 per cent. The second one is the present value loss as a share of the pre-
displacement wage and equals 9.2 months of wages.26 As argued in Fella and Tyson (2013),
this latter measure is the natural benchmark for the size of the optimal severance pay and
we will refer to it in what follows.
4.2. Quantitative effects of severance pay in the benchmark economy
This section discusses the allocational and welfare effects of introducing severance pay in
the benchmark economy.
In assessing the welfare consequences of any policy change one should ideally take into
account the transition path to the new steady state. This is a very costly computational
task in our environment, as it requires tracing the equilibrium sequence of the rate of re-
turn on capital, average wage and labor income tax along the transition. For this reason,
we restrict attention to a comparison of steady states. We report welfare effects accord-
ing to two different welfare criteria in order to facilitate relating our results to the existing
literature. The first is the one used in Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu (1992) and Rogerson and
Schindler (2002). It measures welfare changes as the fraction—constant across time and
contingencies—by which consumption in the benchmark economy would have to be scaled
to equalize the lifetime utility of a newborn in the benchmark economy to the utility of a
newborn in the counterfactual economy.27 The second welfare criterion averages the hetero-
geneous individual gains in lifetime utility associated with switching from the benchmark
to the counterfactual economy (keeping constant each individual’s state) where the weights
are given by the steady-state, cross-sectional distribution in the benchmark economy. The
welfare gain is the fraction—constant across time, contingencies and individuals—by which
consumption in the benchmark economy would have to be scaled for the average gain to be
zero.28 This average welfare criterion is used, for example, in Chatterjee et al. (2007) and is
26The corresponding numbers, though for earnings rather than income losses, in Davis and von Wachter
(2011) are respectively 11.9 per cent and 20.5 months for the workers satisfying their selection criterion.
27Since newborns have zero assets, this welfare measure is in general very sensitive to agents’ borrowing
ability early in life. We have assumed a natural borrowing limit exactly to minimize this effect.
28This average welfare criterion can be seen as either trading off (according to a utilitarian social welfare
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comparable to the one employed by Alvarez and Veracierto (2001).29
In most countries, levels of both privately-negotiated and mandated severance pay in-
crease linearly with job tenure, subject possibly to a maximum limit (see, e.g., OECD, 2013;
Parsons, 2013). Table B.4 in Appendix B.2 reports levels of statutory severance pay for
three different levels of tenure for a number of OECD countries. Since our aim is to quantify
the effect of realistic measures, we study the effect of severance payments that are linear in
tenure. In particular, we consider severance payments equal to 0.3, 0.6, 0.9 and 1.2 months
of the last wage per each year of tenure.30 These values span most of the spectrum from the
least (UK) to the most restrictive (Spain) country. To get an idea of the average payment
involved, average completed job tenure in our benchmark economy is 6 years.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 3 reports the allocational and welfare effects of introducing severance payments—
columns 3 to 6—compared to the employment-at-will benchmark economy in column 2.31
Severance pay marginally increases the number of non-participants, as job losers have
higher assets compared to the baseline economy. The unemployment rate also marginally
increases as the reduction in the number of searchers is concentrated among relatively older,
wealthier workers. Since the probability of losing one’s job is decreasing in age, the fall in the
average age of (searching) unemployed, and therefore also of employed, workers marginally
increases the average job destruction and unemployment rates.
Severance pay also reduces precautionary savings and therefore the supply of assets. It
follows that the equilibrium capital stock32 and output fall. Consumption follows a pattern
function) distributional effects across ex post heterogeneous individuals or as evaluating expected lifetime
utility under the veil of ignorance of not knowing when in the cross-sectional distribution one would be
placed.
29To the best of our understanding Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) weigh allocations in the counterfactual
economy by the steady-state distribution in the counterfactual, rather than the benchmark, economy. We
have verified that there is little difference in using their rather than our ex post measure.
30We evaluate the severance payment for a job losers at the mid-point of her tenure bin.
31Output, consumption and welfare changes are reported as a percentage of their values in the benchmark
economy.
32The difference between the capital stock and the aggregate supply of assets in tables 3-6 is the aggregate
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similar to output, but its variability is substantially reduced. As in Alvarez and Veracierto
(2001) (cf. their tables 4 and 5), the fall in the asset supply, and therefore, in output and
consumption is not monotonic though. As severance pay increases from 0.9 to 1.2 months
per year of tenure, job losers are overinsured and save to finance consumption during employ-
ment. The increase in savings is so significant that the stock of capital increases. The fall
in consumption variability, though, is substantial and monotonic, more than compensating
for the fall in aggregate consumption relative to laissez-faire. As a result welfare increases
and the increase is significant, ranging from 0.3 to 1 percentage point with minor differences
between the two welfare metrics.
In order to understand what drives the welfare gains it is useful to decompose them into
a pure insurance—at constant interest rate—effect and the effect associated with the general
equilibrium response of the interest rate and the capital stock. The general equilibrium
increase in the interest rate has two implications. On the one hand, it increases the cost of
capital to firms and reduces output and wages, reducing workers’ welfare. On the other hand,
it increases the return to saving which is welfare-increasing for savers but welfare-reducing
for, the mostly young, borrowers. Table 4 reports the results for the same policy change, but
at constant interest rate. Comparing the welfare changes with their counterparts in Table 3
reveals that the general equilibrium increase in the interest rate offsets roughly one third of
the pure insurance, partial equilibrium, welfare gains.
[Table 4 about here]
In a related paper, Rogerson and Schindler (2002) compute the welfare costs of dis-
placement risk; namely the risk of persistent wage loss. They consider an economy without
unemployment and model displacement as a one-off, permanent fall in workers’ productivity.
On the basis of the estimates in Jacobson et al. (1993), they parameterize displacement risk
as a 0.25 probability of a permanent 30 per cent fall in the intercept of the labor income
process at age 45. They compute the benefits of completely eliminating such risk and argue
value of firms—the second addendum in the square bracket in equation (E.1) in the online Appendix E—
which is negative in the economy with severance pay. A negative aggregate value of firms is consistent with
a competitive banking sector, since wages ensure that the internal rate of return on new firms coincides with
the market interest rate.
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that this can be achieved by a one-off payment (severance pay) to displaced workers equal to
about four years of pre-displacement wages. For our chosen value of the CRRA coefficient—
η = 2—their results imply a welfare gain, measured from the perspective of a newborn, of
about 0.5 percentage points at constant interest rate and 0.3 in general equilibrium.33
In our framework a severance payment of 1.2 months per year of tenure—i.e., on average
7.2 months of wages, against their four years—implies substantially larger gains. The main
difference is due to the fact that, although our model features a lower displacement risk at
age 46 and earnings losses that are persistent but not permanent, it features ongoing risk in
every period. This cumulates to a larger overall risk and implies welfare gains that are three
times as large as those computed by Rogerson and Schindler (2002).
While tables 3 and 4 report welfare gains over a range of severance payments covering
most OECD countries, it is instructive to explore the welfare implications over a broader
range of values. To this effect, Figure 3 plots gains/losses according to our two welfare
metrics, both in general equilibrium and at constant interest rate, as a function of the
average severance pay.34 For comparison, the average lifetime income loss associated with
displacement is 9.2 months in our benchmark economy as discussed in Section 4.1.
At constant interest rate, the average severance pay maximizing either of our two welfare
metrics is around 11 months, roughly 20% larger than the lifetime income loss.35 In general
equilibrium, the severance payment maximizing our average welfare criterion is only about 7
months, corresponding exactly to the value in the last column of tables 3 and 4. As discussed
above, the general equilibrium fall in the interest rate reduces welfare for the average agent.
Finally, in general equilibrium the welfare of newborns is maximized for an average severance
33These numbers are obtained by linearly interpolating the welfare gains when η = 1.5 and η = 3 in
Rogerson and Schindler (2002). Their partial equilibrium welfare gains are indeed linear in the CRRA
coefficient, but the general equilibrium gains are less than linear. In this sense, 0.3 is an overestimate of the
general equilibrium gains in their model for η = 2.
34As in tables 3 and 4, our computations assume that severance is proportional to tenure. The coefficient
of proportionality can be obtained by dividing the average payment in Figure 3 by the average job duration
of 6 years.
35This is consistent with Fella and Tyson’s (2013) result that, at constant interest rate, the optimal
payment is bounded below by the lifetime income loss.
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pay equal to 27 months. The intuition behind this, apparently surprising, result is that, as
discussed above, an average severance pay in excess of 7 months increases aggregate saving,
as overinsured job losers save to finance consumption during employment. The fall in the
equilibrium interest36 rate associated with the increase in the capital stock, benefits young
agents, who are net borrowers, but reduces capital income and welfare for the middle-aged
net savers. Unlike the average welfare measure, which gives equal weight to all agents
independently of age, considering welfare from the viewpoint of newborns discounts the
backloaded losses associated with the lower return to positive wealth accumulation later in
life thus failing to capture the conflict of interest among different, contemporaneous cohorts.37
[Figure 3 about here]
4.3. Quantitative effects of severance pay with no tenure effects
The purpose of our model has been to isolate the welfare gains from the pure insurance
role of severance pay. In this sense, the gains we find are additional to the gains associated
with the firing tax component of severance pay in the presence of downward rigid wages
identified in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001).38 Yet, the welfare gains we compute may, at
first, appear surprising in the light of Alvarez and Veracierto’s (2001) findings that the welfare
gains from the pure-transfer (what they call the “unemployment-insurance”) component of
severance pay are negligible in general, and negative for values of severance pay exceeding
three months of wages (see their Section 5.2, in particular tables 4 and 5).
Our model is indeed close to Alvarez and Veracierto (2001). The main difference is that
in their model there are no returns to job tenure; the only risk associated with job loss
36This effect is absent from Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) and Rogerson and Schindler (2002), who rule
out borrowing altogether.
37Furthermore, our maintained assumption of flexible wages (full bonding) is likely to be violated, and
therefore both welfare measures are likely to be upward-biased, at high levels of the average severance pay.
38As pointed out by Ljungqvist (2002), the sizable welfare gains from the introduction of severance pay
in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) do not stem from market incompleteness, but from the assumption that
job loss is involuntary due to downward wage rigidity. As shown by Fella (2000), in such an environment,
severance pay increase welfare and efficiency by making firms internalize workers’ cost of involuntary job
loss.
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is that of transiting temporarily through unemployment. To understand the quantitative
importance of the loss of tenure we simulate our model by shutting down the tenure-related
component of productivity. The results are reported in Table 5 and are very much in line
with those in Table 5 in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001), featuring endogenous search effort.
Small values of severance pay marginally reduce consumption variability and saving. For
larger values, consumption variability and saving eventually increase as unemployed workers
are overinsured and unemployed agents save to finance consumption during employment.
According to the average welfare metric, which is the counterpart of that used in Alvarez
and Veracierto (2001), the welfare gains are zero or negative and very similar in magnitude
to those they find.
[Table 5 about here]
In fact the comparison of the average post welfare gains in our Table 3 and Table 5
reveals that the differential gains from providing insurance against persistent earnings losses
are even larger than the net gains in Table 3. Intuitively, in the absence of persistent earnings
losses, the job loss risk faced by the average individual is easily insured given the duration
of the average unemployment spell. On the other hand, the loss of tenure associated with
displacement is persistent for two reasons. First, the higher the tenure in the previous job
the longer it takes to rebuild it in the new match, even conditionally on the match surviving.
Second, the probability of job loss is decreasing in tenure. Therefore, the average welfare
gains from insuring against displacement risk are sizable.
From the perspective of a newborn, though, the gains from severance pay are half as large
relative to the case in which wages increase with tenure, but still positive. For a newborn
the insurance provided by severance pay is more valuable than for the average individual, as
young individuals hold less assets and have a higher desire to bring consumption forward,
given that wages increase with age.
The important message from these results is that, to the extent that it generates coun-
terfactually small and transitory earnings losses from displacement, the standard search
literature substantially underestimates the potential benefits of insurance against job loss.
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4.4. Tenure-independent severance pay
The previous section has made clear how the gains from severance pay revolve around
the persistence of displacement losses. Both these losses and their persistence are higher
for workers with higher tenure. This seems to call for insurance against job loss to be
increasing in tenure. To verify this hypothesis we simulate the model under the assumption
that severance pay is independent of tenure. For comparability we impose that the average
severance pay is the same as in the counterpart economy with linear severance pay considered
in Section 4.2. Given an average completed job tenure of 6 years, this implies a severance
pay of 1.8, 3.6, 5.4 and 7.2 months, respectively.
Table 6 reports the results. Comparing them to those in Table 3 suggests that, from the
perspective of a newborn, these effects are negligible as they accrue into the future. Yet,
measured from the perspective of the average individual, welfare gains are between 15 and
20 per cent larger in the economy in which severance pay increases linearly with tenure.
[Table 6 about here]
This result may provide a rationale for the stylized fact that both privately negotiated
and mandated severance pay is indeed increasing in tenure in most countries (Parsons 2013).
5. Discussion
This paper focuses on measuring the insurance benefits of severance pay when job dis-
placement implies persistent earnings losses and markets are incomplete. To this effect we
have concentrated our efforts on carefully modeling the various aspects of job loss risk,
namely its evolution over tenure and age, and purposefully abstracted from other potential
roles of severance pay.
In line with most of the matching literature, the assumption that wage setting is privately
(constrained-) efficient, and therefore wages are flexible at the match level, distinguishes this
paper from Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) who emphasize the sizable welfare gains associated
with the (Pigouvian) tax role of severance pay when wages are downward-rigid in the face of
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idiosyncratic productivity shocks.39 Assuming wage flexibility abstracts from this mechanism
and our welfare gains are additional to those they find.
As first pointed out by Lazear (1990), severance pay is in fact neutral if wages are flexible
and asset markets complete. Complete asset markets are not crucial for this result as long
as bargaining is efficient, as shown by Fella and Tyson (2013).40
The assumption that workers have all the bargaining power in wage negotiations still
implies efficient bargaining, but substantially simplifies the model computation. If firms
had positive bargaining power, the distribution of wages would depend on the workers’
asset distribution, as shown in Krusell et al.’s (2010) version of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) with CRRA preferences, period-by-period wage bargaining with symmetric weights
and endogenous interest rate. Reassuringly, Krusell et al. (2010) find that the dependence
of wages on workers’ asset position does not have quantitatively significant effects. We have
actually verified that introducing a severance payment up to 6 months of wages in the steady-
state version of Krusell et al. (2010) has a negligible impact on the equilibrium allocation of
labor and the interest rate.41
In a nutshell, privately (constrained-)efficient wage setting implies that severance pay
are near-neutral, independently from whether asset markets are complete and the particular
value of workers’ bargaining power. Therefore, our assumption that severance pay does
not affect the firm-level dynamics—namely the job destruction rate and job finding rate for
searching workers— not only buys us substantial tractability, but is in fact consistent with
the implications of wage flexibility.
While the assumption that severance pay does not affect threat points when bargaining
39In fact, if wages are downward rigid, the tax role of severance pay is welfare improving even under
complete markets (see Fella, 2000).
40While Fella and Tyson (2013) assume that workers have CARA preferences and borrowing is uncon-
strained, the same result holds in an earlier version with CRRA preferences and hand-to-mouth workers.
41In particular, a severance payment equal to six months of wages increases the aggregate capital stock
by 0.14%, and the unemployment rate by 0.02 percentage points. Results are available upon request. We
were not able to obtain convergence for higher value of the severance pay. Moreover, introducing wage and
tenure effects in Krusell et al.’s (2010) model would have entailed a functional fixed point problem with as
many wage schedules as worker types (110 in our case), which is computationally intractable.
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with new hires (‘outsiders’) is a natural and common one, the literature entertains two
different assumptions on how severance pay affects wages for continuing workers who have
matured entitlement to it (‘insiders’). The first one (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999)
implicitly maintains that insider workers are able to unilaterally secure severance pay in case
of disagreement. As a result, a severance payment θ reduces the firm’s and increases the
worker’s bargaining threat point. Effectively, insider workers receive the severance pay with
probability one: either as a wage premium equal to the annuity value rθ or as a transfer
θ upon separation.42 The alternative assumption (see Ljungqvist, 2002) is that severance
pay affects wages only indirectly but not, directly, through the bargaining threat points.
This is consistent with the point made by Binmore et al. (1986) that the appropriate threat
points are the parties’ expected payoffs in case of perpetual disagreement and not the payoffs
that the parties would obtain by irreversibly breaking the match to trade outside (outside
options). Applications of this insight are Hall and Milgrom (2008) and the wage renegotiation
framework introduced by MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and used in Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002) and their subsequent work. This is also the route we follow here.
If workers are risk-neutral, Ljungqvist (2002) shows that the two assumptions are equiva-
lent, the only difference being a backloading of payments from firms to workers in the case in
which severance pay are paid in case of a breakdown in bargaining. If workers are risk-averse,
though, this equivalence no longer holds. As in Alvarez and Veracierto (2001), under our
assumption severance pay can potentially provide insurance. In the alternative case, though,
the purely deterministic backloading of payments is either fully undone—if Ricardian equiv-
alence applies—or reduces insurance—if, as in our framework, Ricardian equivalence fails.
Among the many possible bargaining protocols, the one assuming that severance pay is due
in case of a breakdown in bargaining is the only one that delivers this counter-intuitive result.
This lack of generality and the related argument in Binmore et al. (1986) that, whenever
there is ambiguity about the appropriate threat points one should get guidance by modeling
the bargaining process strategically, induced us not to pursue this alternative route in the
42If workers are risk neutral, this is true independently of their bargaining power (Mortensen and Pissarides,
1999). If workers are risk averse, it can be shown analytically that it is still true if workers’ bargaining power




This paper has provided a quantitative equilibrium framework to study the insurance
properties of severance payments when markets are incomplete and workers’ job displacement
risk includes the kind of sizable and persistent earnings documented, for example, in Couch
and Placzek (2010) and the literature they survey. Our focus has been to carefully model
the various aspects of job loss risk while abstracting from other potential roles of severance
pay emphasized in previous literature.
We find that the introduction of severance pay entails sizable welfare gains. These gains
are due to the difficulty of self-insuring against the persistent earnings loss upon displacement
stemming from the loss of job-specific human. In line with existing studies, we find that
severance pay reduces average welfare if the only cost of job displacement is the transitory
income loss associated with transiting through unemployment. The average welfare gain we
find is higher if severance pay is an increasing function of tenure, consistently with observed
privately-negotiated and mandated severance packages.
Our conservative calibration of post-displacement earnings losses implies that our quan-
titative findings may understate the actual welfare gains from severance pay. On the other
hand, our analysis likely overestimates the benefits of severance pay, to the extent that job
losers have access to additional forms of insurance, such as risk sharing at the household
level, beyond the single risk-free asset in the model.
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Value Source/Target
Value of assigned parameters
Newborns’ asset endowment a0 0 –
CRRA coefficient η 2.0 Attanasio (1999)
Age (i = 1, 2, . . . , 10) transition pii 0.033 A jump every 5 years
Retirement prob. ρi 0 (i < 7); Median age of workers
0.02 (i ≥ 7)
Pensioners’ death prob. pid 0.0238 % of retirees ≈ 16% (Census)
Tenure (t = 1, 2, . . . , 11) transition pit 0.083 A jump every 2 years
UI benefit replacement rate RR 0.5 Avg. replacement rate
UI benefit loss prob. pib 0.333 Avg. time limit 6 months
Food stamps g 0.077 Avg. transfer ($140/m) (USDA 2014)
Pension yp 0.394 ∗ w¯ OECD (2011)
Severance Payments γt 0 Employment at will
Capital share α 0.3 NIPA
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.017 I/Y = 0.22 (NIPA)
Job finding prob. φ(1) 0.52 Un. duration ≈ 16.4w (CPS)
εs - Productivity values See Table 2 Regression on CPS data
Borrowing limit d – Natural borrowing limit
Value of calibrated parameters
Disutility of search effort v 3.735 0.06 - ratio of marginally-attached
to unemployed workers (CPS)
Job losing prob. baseline σ 0.042 Unemployment/tenure moments (CPS)
Job losing prob. tenure gradient σ0t 0.094 ”
Job losing prob. tenure gradient σ1t 0.009 ”
Job losing prob. age gradient σi 0.035 Unemployment/age moments (CPS)
Discount factor β 0.998 4% - annual interest rate
Table 1: Parameter values in the benchmark economy
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Parameter OLS (CPS) Tobit (CPS) OLS (Model)
Age .0262816 .0263248 .0257998
(.00055) (.0004587) −
Age2 −.0000507 −.0000508 −.0000497
(1.22e− 06) (9.92e− 07) −
Age∗Tenure −.0000965 −.0000949 −.0000963
(.0000149) (.0000138) −
Age2∗Tenure 2.03e− 07 2.00e− 07 2.03e− 07
(3.27e− 08) (2.91e− 08) −
Age∗Tenure2 2.43e− 08 2.58e− 08 2.43e− 08
(3.47e− 08) (3.20e− 08) −
Tenure .0172868 .0171138 .016948
(.0016133) (.0015543) −
Tenure2 −.0000339 −.0000347 −.0000339
(.000011) (.0000104) −
Constant 4.624496 4.618056 −2.907707
(.0573555) (.049042) −
Year Dummies Y es Y es −
N. Obs 36013 36013 158809
R2 (Pseudo R2) 0.2482 (0.1260) 1.0000
Table 2: Log Earnings Pooled OLS Regressions, t-statistics in parenthesis. For the Tobit model, the right
censoring point is 9.33, and there are 831 censored observations. (Data: CPS Displaced Workers/Job Tenure
Supplement, 1996-2006). The model is stationary, and the year dummies don’t have to be included. The
constant in the model differs from the estimated one, because the highest value of the efficiency units is
normalized to one. The OLS estimates for the model do not have standard errors, because we are running
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Figure 1: Calibration - Model Fit.
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Figure 3: Welfare maximizing average severance pay.
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Severance pay
Months of wages/year 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2
Unemployment rate (%) 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.4
Non-participants/searchers (%) 6.2 7.1 7.7 8.5 9.2
Output 100.0 99.7 99.5 99.5 99.6
Capital 100.0 99.1 98.6 97.8 98.9
Assets 100.0 98.9 98.2 97.2 98.1
Consumption 100.0 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.8
S.D. consumption 100.0 97.4 95.6 94.3 93.4
Welfare (newborns) 100.0 100.3 100.6 100.8 101.0
Welfare (average) 100.0 100.4 100.6 100.7 100.8
Table 3: Allocational and welfare effects of linear severance-pay
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Severance pay
Months of wages/year 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2
Unemployment rate (%) 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.4
Non-participants/searchers (%) 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.6 8.5
Output – – – – –
Capital – – – – –
Assets 100.0 96.8 94.8 93.5 93.9
Consumption 100.0 99.8 99.7 99.7 99.8
S.D. consumption 100.0 95.6 92.9 91.5 91.5
Welfare (newborns) 100.0 100.5 101.0 101.3 101.5
Welfare (average) 100.0 100.4 100.8 101.1 101.4
Table 4: Allocational and welfare effects of linear severance-pay (constant interest rate)
Severance pay
Months of wages/year 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.2
Unemployment rate (%) 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1
Non-participants/searchers (%) 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7
Output 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.3 100.6
Capital 100.0 100.0 100.4 101.1 102.3
Assets 100.0 99.8 100.0 100.6 101.5
Consumption 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.1
S.D. consumption 100.0 99.6 99.3 99.5 99.8
Welfare (newborns) 100.0 100.2 100.3 100.4 100.5
Welfare (average) 100.0 100.1 100.0 99.9 99.7
Table 5: Allocational and welfare effects of linear severance-pay: no job-specific human capital
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Severance pay
Months of wages 0 1.8 3.6 5.4 7.2
Unemployment rate (%) 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3
Non-participants/searchers (%) 6.2 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.1
Output 100.0 99.7 99.6 99.6 99.6
Capital 100.0 99.1 98.6 98.6 98.9
Assets 100.0 98.9 98.2 98.0 98.2
Consumption 100.0 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9
S.D consumption 100.0 98.5 97.4 96.0 94.8
Welfare (newborns) 100.0 100.3 100.6 100.8 101.0
Welfare (average) 100.0 100.3 100.5 100.7 100.7
Table 6: Allocational and welfare effects of (tenure-independent) severance-pay
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